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Abstract 
National, state-based visa waivers are ‘blunt instruments’ for border, immigration, and mobility management. A 
symbol of the tension between the norms of reciprocity and unilateralism: the unilateral imposition of a Canadian 
visa on Czech nationals caused diplomatic turbulence between the Czech and Canadian governments, and posed a 
policy problem for the EU. Should all EU member states impose a reciprocal visa on Canadians or undermine the 
norm of reciprocity and admit that certain member states and bilateral relations are more important than others?  
The proposed long-term policy solution is a ‘next generation’ visa that is capable of targeting individuals rather 
than entire state populations. We argue that  i) there is no evidence in current profiling or risk assessment systems 
that any programme can provide a compelling, efficient, and secure target list and ii) individualised visa 
restrictions targeting would violate international legal obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. 
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The ‘Next Generation’ Visa 
Belt and braces or the emperor’s new clothes? 
Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu
* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, October 2011 
Introduction  
Visa policy represents a nexus of conflicting imperatives for contemporary, developed, liberal 
states. There are commercial and social pressures in favour of integration and movement; a 
security impetus to protect the population; international human rights obligations; procedural 
and substantive justice concerns for the recognition and the settlement of refugees; and 
efficiency concerns about border management. Canada and European Union (EU) member 
states, for example, manage these complex pressures through visas, visa-waiver programmes 
and multilateral or bilateral visa agreements. The recent Canada-Czech Republic visa issue 
illustrates the degree to which there is tension between the EU’s norm of visa reciprocity and 
Canada’s independent assessment of visa exemption on a country-by-country basis. Canada, the 
EU, and EU member states are discussing a ‘next generation’ visa that would not be based on 
country of origin or nationality, but capable of being targeted at individuals. 
One of the primary markers of state sovereignty is the authority to control population, and 
specifically to delimit and police international borders. To manage the large volume of border-
crossings states have adopted the practice of rendering decisions at a distance, off-shore, before 
the migrant, traveller, or asylum seeker arrives at the physical border crossing. While passports 
are used to identify nationals that have a right to re-enter their country of citizenship, visas are 
used to represent a prima facie case for travel to a particular country. Visa approval does not 
however imply entry to the destination country, as border police retain a clear sovereign right to 
admit or refuse entry to any traveller. Admission is based on domestic law and regulations, but 
is also informed by the structure of international law, in particular citizenship rights and the 
rights of refugees. 
State of play 
Home affairs, foreign relations, and immigration ministries manage this consulate work through 
national-level decisions about visa waivers. Defining visa waivers on a country-by-country 
basis, or on a bi- or multilateral basis is, in the words of the former Canadian Minister of 
Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Jason Kenny, at best 
a very blunt instrument. It undermines Canada’s commercial and diplomatic interests. 
It’s a necessary tool to use in a managed immigration system but you want to [use it] 
only as your last resort (sic) (2010). 
Between the EU and Canada, we see an example of two prevailing norms for visa waivers: 
policy and political turbulence can arise when these norms conflict. 
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In the EU, member state (MS) visa policies are part of the Schengen acquis, and so all member 
state visa policies are coordinated through a so-called ‘white’ and ‘black’ list. The EU adheres 
to the norm of reciprocity, in that visa-waivers are granted for states that grant visa-waivers to 
EU nationals. In this way, although visa policy is part of Directorate General Home Affairs, it 
becomes an important diplomatic tool for the European External Action Service, particularly in 
the negotiation of framework or trade agreements (Brazil and Canada, for example). Alongside 
the treaties and agreements governing the management of migration is the system for refugee 
adjudication. Two tools dominate the integration of the refugee adjudication system in Europe: 
safe-third country agreements and the Aznar Protocol. In the former, the EU has negotiated 
agreements with neighbouring countries, so that irregular migrants or asylum seekers must 
claim refugee status in the first ‘safe’ country in which they are physically present: an asylum 
seeker who enters the EU from Ukraine (either from Ukraine itself or if Ukraine is simply a 
transit state) must thus make their asylum claim in Ukraine, as part of the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agenda. The Aznar Protocol on Asylum (Protocol 24 of the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1999) on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the European Union) on the other hand 
asserts that all member states of the European Union will regard other member states as safe 
countries of origin. This makes it extraordinarily difficult for EU citizens to make asylum 
claims in another EU member state (although a small number of such cases do exist; perhaps 25 
in the last five years). 
In the Canadian case, visas are viewed as a natural exercise of the sovereign right to control 
borders, and a visa waiver is seen as an exception and a privilege. Visa waivers are considered 
on a case-by-case basis, weighted by objective standards. Canada has a unilateral visa waiver 
programme that is based on Canadian investigations of specific countries – not reciprocity 
(Robbins-Wright, 2011). Visa policy is the responsibility of the Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC). While Canada follows a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, the legislation that 
governs visa and refugee determination policy is the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, or Bill C-
11 that speaks directly to CIC. One of the most hotly debated innovations in C-11 was the 
introduction of a category of “designated countries of origin.” Following a similar logic to the 
Aznar Protocol, asylum seekers from designated countries of origin still enjoy the same legal 
process of investigation and appeal upon arriving in Canada. Under C-11, however, both the 
adjudication and appeals processes for those from designated countries of origin are expedited 
and their claims are adjudicated by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), a quasi-
independent board that reaches its decisions independent of visa or immigration policy. 
In terms of multilateral relations, we can see the problems that can arise in this complex 
environment. The EU wants reciprocity, but Canada does not accept any such prima facie 
obligation. 
The Canada-Czech-EU visa dispute 
To take a clear example: in March 2009, Canada imposed a visa restriction on the Czech 
Republic, having recently granted a visa waiver to Czech nationals in 2007. The then-Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration, Jason Kenney invoked several arguments for this re-imposition 
of the visa: one argument, in keeping with the logic of the Aznar Protocol, suggested that “it is 
hard to believe that the Czech Republic is an island of persecution in Europe”;
1 the second 
argument was one of efficiency and fraud, the large number of claimants originating from the 
Czech Republic – and the large proportion of cases that were abandoned – suggested to the 
government that there was widespread abuse, and that these applications were a way to ‘jump 
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the queue’ to get into Canada. This claim was supported anecdotally by reports of transnational 
organised networks and a Czech television programme extolling the ease of the Canadian 
refugee system. The government presented two aspects of this argument: the large number of 
claims was themselves an issue, despite the proportion of claims that were accepted, and the 
large number of abandoned claims was interpreted as indicating fraud (and not frustration, fear, 
or a loss of trust in the adjudication/appeals process). The IRB, however, did grant a number of 
asylum seekers refugee status during this period of increased flows, although the individualised 
structure of the IRB process makes it impossible to prove with certainty that the claimants were 
Czech Roma in particular, and neither the CIC nor the IRB collect data on ethnicity. We can 
infer that the Roma were well-represented in that claimant population because in March 2009, 
the Research Directorate of the IRB researched an issue paper, which was published in July 
2009: “Fact-finding mission report on the situation and treatment of Roma and potential for 
internal relocation” (IRB, 2009).  
Currently, a visa is still required for Czech nationals, and asylum claimants have dropped to pre-
waiver levels. Both Canada and the Czech Republic officials claim publicly that the visa issue is 
minor and does not have a negative impact on a rich and profitable bilateral relationship. Both 
states have agreed that their aim is visa-free travel, and there are high-level groups working 
towards this goal. However, it remains an issue that preoccupies both states. 
The Czech Republic is restricted in its options because of their commitment to the Schengen 
zone; under the Schengen acquis, the Czech Republic is unable to impose a retaliatory visa on 
all Canadian nationals, although it has imposed a visa restriction on government and diplomatic 
passports. The Czech Republic might wish to invoke the norm of reciprocity, but it is unclear 
whether the EU and its member states are willing to impose visas on the 2 million annual 
Canadian visitors to the European Union for the sake of 12 thousand annual Czech visits to 
Canada. However, as the EU is unwilling to impose a reciprocal visa, does it lose credibility 
with member states – particularly since Canada still requires visas on Bulgarian and Romanian 
nationals? The EU is also in the process of negotiating a general framework agreement with 
Canada, which will allow free trade in goods and services. Because this ‘mixed’ agreement will 
need to be ratified by each individual member state legislature under existing EU rules, there is 
a danger that the relatively minor issue of visa policy could derail a more major multilateral 
treaty. 
Because visas are national, they are a blunt instrument. Consequently, states – and in particular 
Canada and CIC – are seeking a ‘next generation visa’ that will allow the instrument to become 
more refined. 
The ‘next generation’ visa 
Effective policy choice in this area is exceptionally difficult to assess. Traditional standards of 
efficiency, effectiveness, and risk management are insufficient (Papademetriou & Collett, 
2011). On the one hand, the cost of failure of these border management systems, if the result is 
catastrophic, is difficult to calculate in terms of impact on GDP, foreign relations, or national 
security. On the other hand, the cost of success is an ongoing drag on border processing and an 
increased economic cost to international travel. There are also hidden costs, in terms of both 
public diplomacy (the global perception of Canadian or EU values) and in terms of the state's 
obligations under international law, in particular obligations under the United Nations refugee 
regime. If we accept that states must manage irregular migration through visa policies while 
respecting domestic obligations under international law, policies need to balance the standards 
of procedural and substantive justice: visa policies must treat each individual request for entry 
and each claim for asylum fairly and efficiently.  4 | SALTER & MUTLU 
 
Government agencies seek to manage this border problem by both facilitating the smooth travel 
of those travellers who are ‘low-risk’ or ‘trusted’ and by implementing multiple pre-border 
checks on ‘high-risk’ travellers: within the industry and government field, this is often 
expressed as the merging of facilitation and security concerns (Koslowski, 2011). 
In several recent meetings, EU and Canadian officials have intimated that plans are being 
developed for a ‘next generation’ visa that would be able refine the blunt instrument of visa 
waivers and allow for more precise targeting. The new instrument would allow for a 
personalisation or individualisation of the visa. There are three models for targeted visas: the 
now-defunct US National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) programme, 
Australia’s Electronic Travel Authority (ETA) programme, and the new US Electronic System 
for Travel Authorization (ESTA) system. 
In this paper, we do not cover the refugee or asylum systems of these states, although Australia 
in particular has tightened restrictions on asylum seekers, going so far as to exclude territory 
(such as Christmas Island) and seek extra-territorial interdiction and processing (the so-called 
Pacific Solution) (Wilson, 2008). The United States has also recently concluded a Safe Third 
Country Agreement with Canada, modelled on the European example (Macklin, 2005). It 
should be noted that both the United States and Australia seek reciprocal visa waivers, but also 
reserve the absolute right to grant or refuse visa waiver status. For the US, consequently, there 
are three EU members that are not members of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), because of 
objective criteria (similar to Canada’s assessment) in rates of over-stays, rejected applications, 
and fraud (Wilson, 2007). 
The NSEERS programme, which was in place between 2002-2011, was implemented in 
response to security concerns identified by the 9/11 Commission Report (Shora, 2003). Thus, its 
concern is a more narrow focus on homeland security and counter-terrorism. Nationals from 25 
identified countries which were thought to be more likely sources of terrorists were required to 
register at ports-of-entry, regardless of current nationality or nationality of passport. NSEERS is 
an example of negative profiling, and was roundly criticised in terms of efficacy and fairness. 
While not a visa programme, it was specifically implemented as a necessary supplement to the 
visa application process, which was seen as being insecure. In 2004, a wider system was 
implemented that captured biometric (fingerprint and digital photograph) and ‘tombstone’ data 
(name, date of birth, gender, address) of all visitors that did not hold an American passport 
(although the majority of Canadian visitors are exempt, as are Mexican holders of the Border 
Crossing Card or ‘laser visa’). This biometric data is captured at the initial application site and 
again at the border, to deter fraud by comparing the data. The US Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program is required of all non-US passport holders, including 
those applying for admission on immigration visas or as refugees. 
The Australian Electronic Travel Authority is an entirely electronic authority to travel that 
provides a “go/no go” message to travel agents, airline personnel, and border agents based on an 
examination of tombstone data that is entered online or through an agent (Weber, 2007). The 
initial aim was the facilitation of travel, particularly because of the expense of repatriation of 
refused immigrants, but as the Australian government has become sensitised to the issue of 
asylum seekers it also comes to play a role in screening. A special subset of the ETA called the 
e-Visitor is specifically for European states. The screening of potential asylum seekers is, like 
Canada, done at the national level rather than the individual level, and the ETA process does not 
include a risk score for asylum. 
The recent ESTA system in the United States adds a new security screening system to those 
nationals from Visa Waiver Program countries, undoing some of the facilitation benefits of the 
VWP itself. The US VWP is administered through the Department of Homeland Security, and THE NEXT GENERATION VISA | 5 
 
while one of the key components for eligibility is a visa refusal rate of less than 10% and a 
biometric, machine-readable travel document, not all countries that meet these criteria are 
admitted (GAO, 2008). As with the Canada-Czech Republic dispute, the question of visa 
waivers for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland, Romania and Slovenia undermine the EU’s practice of 
reciprocity: there is no European discussion of imposing a visa on US citizens. Like Australia, 
the online application ESTA procedure allows for the pre-clearance of travellers to the US, 
particularly in comparison to no-fly, criminal and terrorism watch lists. At present, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the ESTA system is used for refugee risk scoring. 
There is no evidence either that any of these states are able to marshal data or provide risk 
scores for asylum seeking at the individual level. But there is evidence of informal knowledge 
production and sharing between border agents (Pratt, 2008; Heyman, 2001), although these risk 
profiles are not official, and little data exists about the efficacy or fairness of these profiles. 
Comparison of next generation visa models 
 NSEERS  (USA)  e-Visitor  (Australia) ESTA  (USA) 
Eligibility Selected  States
2 (25)  ETA Selected states
3(42) 
e-Visitor (27) 
Visa Waiver Program
4 (36)  
Dates 2002-2011  ESTA:  1996-present 
eVisitor: 2008-present 
2009-present 
Goal Screening  Facilitation/Screening  Screening 
EU Countries eligible  0  27  22 
   Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom  
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
                                                      
2 Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, 
Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait. 
3 Apply directly online: Brunei, Canada, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, 
United States of America. Apply through service providers: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (SAR), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of 
San Marino, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom – British 
Citizens and British Nationals (Overseas), United States of America, and Vatican City. 
4 Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland , France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxemborg, Malta, Monaco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 6 | SALTER & MUTLU 
 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom  
EU Countries 
excluded  
27  12 
(all eligible under  e-
Visitor) 
5 
  Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom  
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malta 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia  
 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
In each case, we can identify two policy behaviours: cross-checking of tombstone and biometric 
data with current watch-lists, and profiling. Watch-lists might have forensic utility in catching 
repeat offenders of immigration fraud, but have no utility in the adjudication of refugee claims. 
Profiling is the practice of assembling patterns of origin or behaviour that are used to predict 
risk, for homeland security or immigration fraud or fraudulent asylum seeking (Amoore, 2006). 
Informally, for example, border guards might be suspicious of a particular air route or claimant 
narrative. But this kind of profiling cannot be applied to refugee claimants, as there is no 
available historical pattern of data (either successful or unsuccessful applications) that could be 
aggregated to create reliable and legitimate profiles. This is not to say that aggregate data has 
not been used and is effective in making national-level profiles – and indeed forms one of the 
objective bases of the decisions for visa waiver status – but rather that the tool of the profile is 
not only ineffective at making individualised judgments about the prima facie case for an 
asylum claim, but also that it runs counter to due process obligations to treat each application 
independently (Macklin, 2009, p. 137). In short, watch-lists or profiling cannot achieve the 
goals of individualised screening with relation to security or fraud risk. 
In sum, none of these programmes meets the needs of a ‘next generation visa’: while there is 
individual risk-scoring based on passenger-name data and other kinds of profiling, the only 
sustainable, efficient, and fair go/no-go decisions that are based on individual data are 
comparisons to watch-lists, or specifically named individuals. There is no successful example of THE NEXT GENERATION VISA | 7 
 
an individualised screening process that can assess the risk of fraudulent asylum seeking 
populations based on profiles or predictive modelling, which meets states’ obligations under 
international law to treat each asylum case individually.  
Effectiveness: there is no evidence that individualised risk profiling is effective. In the case of 
the Czech asylum claimants, there is no way of identifying if a particular individual was a) 
Roma or b) more likely to be making a fraudulent claim without an investigation into the 
individual claim by IRB. Because asylum seekers must demonstrate a reasonable fear of 
persecution by the very government they flee, it is impossible to determine their potential status 
using government documents. Also, given what we know about the surveillance of the internet 
in authoritarian regimes, requiring an electronic application that might set out the grounds for 
persecution could endanger the applicant. If the visa application process becomes a more 
forensic investigation of grounds for asylum, then it becomes a less independent process than 
the process guaranteed by the institutional separation of the CIC and IRB. 
Efficiency: though a blunt instrument, state-level visa waiver decisions can be made using 
aggregate data and particular investigations, as the Czech case demonstrates. If the purpose of a 
Canadian or EU next generation visa were an additional system that filtered regular and 
irregular migrants, on top of the existing visa waiver programme, then the case for efficiency is 
difficult to make. There is already a no-fly list, and visa system and visa waiver programme; a 
‘belt and braces’ approach – like the ETA or ESTA – would have to make a clear case in terms 
of security or in terms of reduction in false asylum claims, and there is no such evidence from 
the Australian or American cases that their secondary system has that effect. 
Rights: at the moment, individual claims for asylum are processes when nationals arrive on 
Canadian soil, as is their right guaranteed under Canadian law and Canada’s international legal 
obligations. The visa waiver for Czech nationals clearly provided an avenue for asylum seekers 
to claim refugee status in Canada in much higher numbers during the short period of time it was 
in effect. But, if the proportion of asylum claims granted remained the same (not counting 
abandonments as inherently fraudulent), then it is unclear what the justification might be for 
prohibiting those individuals from making that claim without any investigation. 
Conclusion 
National-level visa requirements and visa waivers are no doubt blunt instruments, and when all 
you have is a hammer, every problem tends to look like a nail. However, tombstone data and 
biometric information cannot provide enough evidence to gauge the likelihood of security 
threats or intention to seek asylum (genuinely or fraudulently), and there is no secure way to 
provide enough personal data about persecution that does not endanger the lives of those in 
genuine fear of the state. The existing models of ‘next generation visas’ do not provide added 
security, do not add value in terms of risk mitigation or migration management, do not 
demonstrate gains in efficiency, and do not protect fundamental rights. In other words, scaling 
the focus of visa-waiver process down to the individual has proven to be neither efficient nor 
effective in deterring an influx of asylum seekers or increasing security. Similarly, scaling the 
focus of the visa-waiver process down to the individual level will inevitably create privacy 
concerns and raise issues of profiling. Given the different laws and regulations surrounding 
privacy as well as the differing legal bases of rights in the EU, Canada and the US, such an 
approach to border management will inevitably prove to be problematic. 
In the particular case of the Canada-Czech-EU visa issue, from the perspective of Canada, there 
is no policy tool that will manage the question of Roma asylum seekers: no reliable profile is 
possible that meets the IRB standards or Canada’s obligations under international law, and 
furthermore, there is no way to define or measure the Roma either as individual applicants or as 8 | SALTER & MUTLU 
 
a population because that data is not collected and cannot be inferred. Canada may revisit the 
Czech visa waiver, particularly in light of the upcoming ratification of the Canada-EU 
framework agreement, but any such reconsideration would have to be based on new reporting 
and research from the IRB. There is no clear existing policy that would allow for a new visa 
waiver that could pre-judge asylum cases in a way that is efficient or fair. 
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